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THE SUPREME COURT, ARBITRABILITY
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING*
BERNARD D. MELTZERf

A man does not show his greatness by being at one
extreme, but ratherby touching both at once.-PAScAL
N THREE significant cases decided last term, the Supreme Court considered

for the first time an old and slippery problem-the proper judicial approach to disputes concerning the jurisdiction of arbitrators under collective bargaining agreements. These cases arose under Section 301 of the
LMRA,1 which in Lincoln Mills2 had been interpreted as a mandate to federal
courts to give specific enforcement to agreements for grievance-arbitration
and to fashion a body of substantive law for all actions under that section
for breach of labor agreements. In two of the cases, 3 the union had sought to
compel arbitration by an unwilling employer; in the third,4 enforcement of
an arbitration award. In each of the cases, the Court, reversing the judgment
below, sustained the arbitrator's competence. 5 The Court used these cases as
* This paper was delivered at a meeting of the Labor Law Committee of the Chicago Bar
Association, on October 11, 1960. After that talk, Professor Hays' valuable article, The Supreme Court andLaborLmv, October Term, 1959, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1960), appeared.
His appraisal of the arbitration cases (at pp. 919-34) is, in general, similar to that presented
below.
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
2 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
4 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
s Challenges to arbitral authority include: (1) those urging that the subject matter of a
grievance renders it non-arbitrable; (2) those urging that arbitration is blocked by the moving party's failure to meet procedural prerequisites such as time limitations prescribed by,
or inferred from, the agreement; and (3) those questioning the remedy requested from, or
awarded by, the arbitrator.
The first two kinds of objections are sometimes said to involve "arbitrability," and the
third, "jurisdiction." "Jurisdiction" is, however, broad enough to encompass all three
classes; furthermore, the nature of the challenge is generally made clear by the specific dispute. Hence, the foregoing distinction does not seem a useful one and will not be followed
below.
Denials of arbitrability based on the subject matter of grievances may be further broken
down into those asserting that: (1) the subject matter of a grievance was excluded from arbitration; (2) a grievance is so "unconscionable" or "frivolous" that it is not arbitrable even
though it falls within the literal scope of an arbitration clause; and (3) a grievance involves
a matter beyond the scope of the agreement. The feasibility of efforts to distinguish between
sub-categories (2) and (3) is discussed in the text, commencing at note 45 infra.
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the vehicle for announcing sweeping rules for judicial determination of arbitral authority. These rules sharply limit the judicial function in cases involving
the arbitrator's jurisdiction and impose a heavy burden on a party contesting
such jurisdiction. Correlatively, they recognize a broad arbitral jurisdiction
over grievances and remedies therefor unless an arbitration clause is restricted
by specific limitations. 6 Furthermore, under the view announced by the
concurring Justices7 even such limitations may not foreclose jurisdiction
because they may be overridden by implied obligations of good faith.
The Court justified its approach as a fair interpretation of the parties' bargain, but it found additional and important support in what it considered to
be the national labor policy and the distinctive aspects of labor agreements
and of labor arbitration.8 This paper will be concerned primarily with the
basis for the Court's general approach and its implications for the duty to
bargain.
The first case, American Manufacturing,arose from the employer's refusal
to reinstate an injured employee shortly after the settlement of his claim for
workmen's compensation. 9 In the settlement discussions, the employee's doctor had asserted that the employee had suffered a permanent disability of
twenty-five per cent. Several weeks after the settlement, the union had requested reinstatement on the basis of a contractual provision calling for employment and promotion on the basis of seniority "where ability and efficiency
are equal." The agreement also contained a "standard form" of arbitration
clause (providing for arbitration of any differences "as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this agreement") and a nostrike clause.' 0 The employer, after denying the grievance, had refused to
arbitrate.
In the union's action to compel arbitration, the federal district court had
entered a summary judgment for the employer on the ground that the employee's acceptance of a settlement based on his claim of partial permanent
6See text accompanying notes 28-29 infra.

7 See note 32 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 2 supra and 66 infra.
9 The court order approving the settlement mentioned, but made no findings concerning,
the dispute as to the extent of disability. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d
624, 625 (6th Cir. 1959).

10The arbitration clause also contained a familiar provision denying the arbitrator "authority to add to, subtract from, or modify the terms of the agreement," and provided
for finality of awards. The agreement also contained the following management-rights
clause: "The Management of the works, the direction of the working force, plant layout and
routine of work, including the right to hire, suspend, transfer, discharge or otherwise discipline any employee for cause, such cause being: infraction of company rules, inefficiency,
insubordination, contagious disease harmful to others, and any other ground or reason that
would tend to reduce or impair the efficiency of plant operation; and to lay off employees
because of lack of work, is reserved to the Company, provided it does not conflict with this
agreement. . .

."

363 U.S. at 565 nn.1 & 2.
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disability had estopped him from claiming any seniority or employment
rights. The Sixth Circuit, although conceding that the dispute was covered by
the arbitration clause, had affirmed on a different ground-that the grievance
was "frivolous, patently baseless .... "11 In reaching that conclusion the

court had reviewed, and relied on, the evidence concerning both the grievant's
physical condition and the employer's contention that the grievant was disabled from performing any open job.
Reversing, the Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Douglas,' 2 emphasized the
following considerations: Section 203(d) of the LMRA expresses a national
policy in favor of voluntary grievance-arbitration.1 3 That policy calls for "full
play" for the means of adjustment chosen by the parties.14 It calls also for a
rejection of the Cutler-Hammerdoctrine,I5 which had been invoked by the
Sixth Circuit. Cutler-Hammerhad declared: "If the meaning of the provision
of the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be
anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration." 1 6 That doctrine, said Mr. Justice Douglas, "could only have a crippling effect on grievance arbitration."' 7 Furthermore, it rewrites the standard
arbitration clause which calls for the submission of "all grievances to arbitra11United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1953).
12 Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in result and also joined the concurring "observations" of Justices Brennan and Harlan. Mr. Justice Whittaker wrote a brief and separate
concurrence, stating that "the District Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the merits of
the claim which the parties had validly agreed to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a
'Board of Arbitrators'.. ." 363 U.S. at 569, 573.
'3 Id. at 566.
14Ibid.

IsId.at 566-67.
16 Id. at 567. In Cutler-Hammer,the union had demanded arbitration concerning the payment of a bonus under a clause providing that the employer would "discuss" such a payment
with the union. Judge Fuld, dissenting from an affirmance of the refusal to compel arbitration, had urged that the meaning of the clause was not beyond dispute, but had accepted
the majority's principle that a claim may be "so unconscionable" as to justify judicial refusal
to compel arbitration. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 297 N.Y.
519, 520, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
17 363 U.S. at 567. Query: Would this sweeping charge be substantiated by experience
in New York under Cutler-Hammer?Has arbitration been meaningfully less serviceable in
New York than elsewhere? Have the New York courts been flooded with cases arising
from management's unwillingness to arbitrate? Have unions resisted no-strike clauses because of fears of judicial encroachment on arbitral autonomy? If so, has any resultant difficulty been neutralized by increased receptivity of employers to broad arbitration clauses
resulting from the protection against "frivolous" claims held out by Cutler-Hammer?
I have not investigated these questions, but I doubt that investigation would support
Justice Douglas' charge. The important contribution of arbitration to labor-management
relations (so eloquently stressed by the Justice) suggests that the acceptance or rejection
of Cutler-Hammeror, indeed, ofjudicial enforceability would have only a peripheral impact
on arbitration's usefulness. Cf. the discussion accompanying note 47 and following note
93 infra.
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tion, not merely those that a court may deem to be meritorious." The merits
18
are no business of courts.
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit
all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is then confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is
governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question
of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party
should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and
all that it connotes that was bargained for.... The agreement is to submit all
grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the courts will deem meritorious.
The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those
who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware. 19
The meaning of these observations is made crystal clear by Mr. Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion:
[The] Court finds that the meaning of that "standard" clause is simply that the
parties have agreed to arbitrate any dispute which the moving party asserts to
involve construction of the substantive provisions of the contract, because such a
20
dispute necessarily does involve such a construction.
Thus, as the Court's citation of the New Bedford case 21 suggests, a grievance
is to be held arbitrable if it claims a contract violation even though the grievance on its face appears plainly (to a court) repugnant to the contractual provisions. To be more specific, the Court's general approach implies that the
demand in American Manufacturing would have been arbitrable even though
18 Id. at 568. In support of this proposition, the Court cited New Bedford Defense Prods.
Div. v. Local 1113, 258 F.2d 522, 526 (1st Cir. 1958), which approved Judge Wyzanski's
declaration: "Issues do not lose their quality of arbitrability because they can be correctly
decided only one way." Other decisions by the First Circuit involve, however, a rather active
flirtation with an approach not easy to distinguish from Cutler-Hammer.See Local 201, Int'l
Union of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. General Elec. Co., 262 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1959); Local
No. 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957).
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958), criticized in Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1512 (1959); cf. Wellington, Judge Magruderand the Labor Contract,
id. at 1268, 1292-94. See note 41 infra and accompanying text. See also Newspaper Guild of
Boston v. Boston Herald-Traveler, 238 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1956). For a survey of federal cases
dealing with questions of arbitrability under section 301, see Note, JudicialDetermination
of Arbitrability, 10 SYRAcusE L. REv. 278 (1959).
19 363 U.S. at 567-68. The Court ignores that flooding the grievance-arbitration procedure with "frivolous" claims may prevent the orderly adjustment of genuine claims and
may pervert adjustment mechanisms into pressure devices. See SLcrrER, HEALY & LivERNASH, TiH IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 674 (1960). But cf. Cox,
CurrentProblems in the Lav of GrievanceArbitration,30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 247,261 (1958),
cited 363 U.S. at 568 n.6. It should be noted that employers, by calculated obstructionism,
may also interfere with orderly adjustment. Regardless of whether sound generalization
about the values and costs of "frivolous" grievances is possible, it seems clear that the
courts cannot furnish effective protection against the deliberate overloading of the grievancearbitration process.
20 363 U.S. at 571.
21 New Bedford Defense Prods. Div. v. Local 1113, UAW, 258 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958).
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substantive provisions of the agreement had expressly excluded reinstatement
fights to employees who had suffered a prescribed percentage of disability
and the union had conceded the existence of that percentage. American Manufacturingdid not, of course, involve so extreme a situation. Indeed, the Court,
as Mr. Justice Whittaker's dissent makes clear, could have supported its result on much narrower grounds: that the lower courts had encroached on the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator to take evidence and to appraise the merits of a
claim which on its face was wholly compatible with the agreement.
The second case, United Steel Workers v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co.,22
presented a more troublesome problem than American Manufacturing;it arose
from a grievance protesting the sub-contracting of certain maintenance work.
According to the Court, this sub-contracting had been a factor in reducing
the number of employees by almost one-half during a two-year period. The
employer had, however, been engaged in such sub-contracting for many years.
Furthermore, in successive negotiations, including those preceding the governing agreement, the union had unsuccessfully tried to negotiate contractual
limitations on sub-contracting. Although the dissenting opinion stressed this
history, the Court passed over it in silence and referred only to the provisions
of the agreement. These included: (1) a no-lockout provision-the clause,
according to the union, which had been violated by the sub-contracting;
(2) a no-strike clause; and (3) an inartistically drafted grievance and arbitration clause providing in part as follows:
Issues which conflict with any Federal statute in its application as established by
Court procedure or matters which are strictly a function of management shall not
be subject to arbitration under this section.
Should differences arise between the Company and the Union or its members
employed by the Company as to the meaning and application of the provisions of
this Agreement, or should any local trouble of any kind arise, there shall be no suspension of work on account of such differences, but an earnest effort shall be made
to settle such differences immediately in the following manner .... 23
363 U.S. 574 (1960).
23 Id.at 576. The Court intimated that this clause did not restrict arbitration to questions
involving the "meaning or application" of the contractual provisions: "To be sure the agreement provides that 'matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be subject
to arbitration.' But it goes on to say that if 'differences' arise or if 'any local trouble of any
kind' arises, the grievance procedure shall be applicable." Id. at 583. The Court's literal reading ignores a familiar difference between the scope of the grievance process and of arbitration respectively. Thus, the grievance procedure may cover "any dispute" while arbitration
may be more limited. Otherwise, arbitration, activated by "any dispute," (or by any "local
trouble") would threaten stability by permitting an arbitrator to rewrite the agreement.
The apparent exclusionary thrust of the clause quoted in the text might be avoided on the
ground that "management rights" consist only of those rights not expressly or impliedly
limited by the agreement. Consequently, "local troubles" are arbitrable only if they assert
a violation of the agreement. See Union's Brief for Appellant, pp. 62-63. But that reasoning
presupposes a most oblique method for delineating a familiar arrangement for a broad
grievance procedure and a narrower arbitral jurisdiction, and deletes the exclusion on arbitration from the agreement provided only that the union is willing to assert a contract violation, no matter how fanciful.
22
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The agreement then prescribed as the settlement mechanism a conventional
grievance procedure, culminating in arbitration, and provided that the arbitral
award should be final. The Court held that the unwilling employer should
have been compelled to arbitrate the sub-contracting grievance.
In doing so, it announced a set of comprehensive rules for judicial determination of questions of arbitrability:
(1) "Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute he has not agreed so to submit." 2 4
(2) Whether such agreement exists "is for the court to decide." 2 5 A party
urging that arbitrability is to be decided by the arbitrator "must bear the
26
burden of a clear demonstration of that purpose."
(3) But an even greater burden rests on the defendant in an action to compel arbitration. He loses "unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute."2 7 The Court intimated, however, that this burden in some
situations might be lightened or discharged by a clause expressly excluding
specified matters from arbitration:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particulargrievancefrom arbi-

tration,we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim
from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is
vague and the arbitration clause quite broad. Since any attempt by a court to infer
such a purpose necessarily comprehends the merits, the court should view with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the
substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the services of an
28
arbitrator.
"Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the questions
on which the parties disagree must... come within the scope of the grievance
and arbitration provisions of the collective agreement." 2 9 This is so because
"The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a
vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining
agreement."

30

Before looking more closely at the Court's rules and their internal consistency, it is useful to describe how they were applied in Warrior. The Court
24 363 U.S. at 582.

25 Id. at 583 n.7. The Court limited this statement to agreements such as those involved
in Warrior and Enterprise. But even where an agreement clearly authorizes the arbitrator
to determine his jurisdiction, the issue raised by a refusal to proceed to arbitration remains
a judicial question, which, however, is easy to answer. Whatever the content of the arbitration clause, the court must decide whether there has been a breach of a promise to arbitrate
either the merits of a claim or the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 582-83.
28

Id. at 584-85. (Emphasis added.)

29 Id. at 581.
30 Ibid.
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restricted its inquiry to the words of the agreement and gave decisive effect
to the absence of a provision that all forms of sub-contracting were a "management function." 31 This approach, as Mr. Justice Whittaker's dissent suggested, excluded considerations sharply relevant to the parties' purposes.
Thus, the bargaining and operating history might reasonably have been read
as the equivalent of an express provision that sub-contracting was a management right, and especially so, given the Court's emphasis on the desirability
of placing the words of a labor agreement in their total context. The Court's
eloquent silence concerning the historical context implies that judicial determination of its significance would have involved an improper intrusion into
the merits. This implication provoked an expression of uneasy doubt in the
concurring opinion:
In contrast to American... the arbitration promise here excludes a particular
area from arbitration.... Because the arbitration promise is different, the scope of
the Court's inquiry may be broader. Here, a court may be required to examine the
substantive provisions of the contract to ascertain whether the parties have provided
that contracting out shall be a "function of management." If a court may delve
into the merits to the extent of inquiring whether the parties have expressly agreed
whether or not contracting out was a "function of management," why was it error
for the lower court to evaluate the evidence of bargaining history for the same purpose? Neat logical distinctions do not provide the answer.32
The only answer given by the Court is a rule of thumb: Only a specific
exclusion clause will be adequate to limit the scope of a standard arbitration
clause. But, as already indicated, this mechanical rule obviously ignores the
history of the relationship which may be the most telling evidence of the
parties' purposes. The Court's method in Warrior is thus obviously difficult
to square with its recognition of the consensual nature of arbitration and of
judicial competence over questions of arbitrability. Indeed, where a general
exclusion clause is not given more specific content by other contractual provisions, 33 the Court's approach in effect deletes such a clause.
31
The Court also pointed to the absence of any showing that the parties had that purpose. It is not easy to follow the Court here: Apparently, its meaning is that the agreement
as a whole did not indicate managerial freedom to sub-contract. The Court's silence about
the bargaining and operating history strongly suggests that the required showing must
appear from the face of the agreement; this interpretation was made explicit by the concurring opinion. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
32 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 572 (1960). The concurring
opinion justified the result in Warrior on the following grounds: "On the basis of inconclusive evidence... [the lower courts] found that Warrior was in no way limited by any
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing from contracting out as it pleased-which
would necessarily mean that Warriorwas free completely to destroy the collective bargaining agreement by contracting out all
the work." Ibid.
33 The management-rights clause in Warrior, 168 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D. Ala. 1958),
provided: "The management of the Company and the direction of the working forces, including the right to hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause, or transfer, and the right~to
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Although the Court explicitly disclaimed any intention to treat the general
clause "as mere surplusage," 34 that disclaimer is put into question by the
language which immediately follows it:
"Strictly a function of management" might be thought to refer to any practice
of management in which, under particular circumstances prescribed by the agreement, it is permitted to indulge. But if courts, in order to determine arbitrability,
were allowed to determine what is permitted and what is not, the arbitration clause
would be swallowed up by the exception. Every grievance in a sense involves a claim
that management has violated some provision of the agreement.
Accordingly, "strictly a function of management" must be interpreted as referring
only to that over which the contract gives management complete control and
35
unfettered discretion.
In other words, a general exclusion clause is wholly ineffective unless it is
coupled with a specific substantive provision recognizing management's unfettered control over the subject matter of the grievance. Furthermore, the
Court cast some doubt on whether even such a combination of clauses would
be ineffective to bar arbitration; for the Court, in the next to the last paragraph of Warrior, declared that the principle announced in American Manufacturing was controlling:
"The grievance alleged that the contracting out was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. There was, therefore, a dispute 'as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement' which the parties
36
had agreed would be determined by arbitration."
This declaration is, however, irreconcilable with the Court's earlier statement that arbitration should be denied where a general exclusion clause is
coupled with a provision specifically reserving management control over the
subject matter of the grievance. And that statement in turn is inconsistent
with the Court's admonition to the lower courts to abstain from considering
the merits. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion as a whole suggests a qualification on that admonition when the merits, i.e., the meaning of substantive provisions, are involved in determining the applicability of exclusion clauses.
That qualification, together with the Court's bow to the consensual nature
of arbitration, poses a troublesome question: Should a court faced with an
issue of arbitrability give decisive effect to a clause or a combination of
relieve employees from duty because of lack of work, or for other legitimate reasons, is
vested exclusively in the Company, provided that this will not be used for purposes of discrimination against any member of the Union." The bargaining and negotiating history was
strong evidence that sub-contracting was a "legitimate reason" for layoff.
34 363 U.S. at 583-84.
35 Id.at 585. It should be noted that the Court was concerned only with the issue of arbitrability; thus its observations should not be read as a rejection of the controversial
"reserved rights" theory insofar as adjudication on the merits is concerned.
36 Id. at 585.
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clauses excluding certain matters from arbitration and yet ignore a substantive provision which with equal clarity and specificity places the same matters
within the employer's prerogative? These two kinds of clauses share a common substantive purpose-the recognition of the employer's freedom of action in the area involved. The exclusionary clause implies such freedom no
less than the substantive provision because the former provision must be read
in the light of the entire agreement. Thus, the exclusionary provision, together
with the absence of any substantive limitations in the excluded area, contrasted with the presence of such limitations in other areas, would normally
imply managerial freedom in the excluded area.
The identity of substantive purposes in the two situations does not, however, involve a corresponding identity of purpose with respect to the availability of arbitration for determining whether there has been a breach of agreement. A specific exclusion from the arbitration clause must be read as reflecting the common purpose of denying arbitral jurisdiction in the excluded area.
By contrast, a substantive provision may be designed solely to provide the
arbitrator with a guide for decision and not to oust him of jurisdiction.
The parties' purposes are, however, far more elusive than is suggested by
this explanation, which lies behind the familiar criticisms of Cutler-Hammer.
The dominant criticism,3 7 echoed by the Court, is that Cutler-Hammer rewrites "all disputes" as to contract interpretation into "all meritorious disputes," etc. But what of a judicial interpretation which reads "all disputes"
as "all good-faith disputes"? Such an interpretation would be in the classic
tradition; it would merely require courts to condition arbitration on compliance with the good-faith principle which pervades the general law of contract
and which has been given generous scope in interpreting the substantive provisions of labor agreements. It is true that an attempt to apply that principle
to disputes over arbitral jurisdiction would involve substantial difficulties for
the courts and substantial risks of judicial encroachment on a voluntary
adjustment system. But such risks are inherent in any application of the goodfaith principle. More important, insofar as we are looking for the parties'
purposes, the weighing of such risks is, as Judge Magruder has emphasized, 38
for the parties and not for the courts.
The difficulty with reliance on consensus is a familiar one. The parties, if
they have thought about the role of the courts, are likely to have discordant
purposes, reflecting differing fears and hopes with respect to arbitration. The
37 See, e.g., Summers, JudicialReview of Arbitration,2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 9-13 (1952);
Cox, supra note 18. But cf Herzog, JudicialReview of ArbitrationProceedings-A Present
Need, 5 DE PAuL L. REv. 14 (1955); Jalet, JudicialReview of Arbitration: The JudicialAttitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960).

38 See Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922, 927
(1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
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union, which is usually the moving party, normally is opposed to judicial
limitations on arbitration-the principal means for challenging managerial
conduct during the contract term. Management, although cognizant of the
values of arbitration, is fearful of activistic arbitration which may exceed the
leeway for interpretation and create new obligations under the guise of enforcing old ones. Such fears, which are the staples of the law, loom larger in
the labor arbitration context because, as in the case of insurance and some
other commercial agreements, activism generally is to the advantage of one
side. Under the foregoing circumstances, the imputation of a universal consensus-for the broad diversity of relationships involved-is a familiar fiction,
which is unlikely to mislead even those who use it.
Although the Court paid lip-service to that fiction, its opinions suggested
that the controlling consideration behind its unqualified repudiation of CutlerHammer was the fear of unsympathetic and uninformed judicial encroachment on a private system of adjustment. Experience under the Cutler-Hammer
doctrine, as other observers have emphasized, 39 gave substance to that fear
and support for the Court's rejection of that doctrine.
The dangers of Cutler-Hammer were, however, the inescapable price for
the protection it was designed to provide, i.e., against "unconscionable" or
outrageous results by specialized tribunals. Judicial protection against such
results brings acceptability, as well as risk, to the arbitration system; the
parties, and employers especially, sometimes find that system more acceptable
when it is subjected to judicial checks. 40 The desire for such protection is,
moreover, linked with the broader tradition reflected in judicial control over
administrative and jury determinations. In labor arbitration, as elsewhere,
courts, to avoid "outrages" by others, would undoubtedly commit their own.
A fair assessment of the competing dangers involves obvious difficulties. But
it is clear that such an assessment will not result from headlining judicial
lapses and ignoring those of arbitrators. Such one-sidedness will instead lead
to the extravagant treatment of labor arbitration which, as we will see, entered into the Court's decisions. In any event, Lincoln Mills gives an ironic
twist to the Court's view that labor arbitrators are giants in dealing with the
exotic mysteries of the labor agreement, while even the best courts are dwarfs.
It is strange that courts, competent to fashion a new law for the labor agreement, are so unqualified to deal with the "merits" of grievances that they
cannot be trusted to enforce a pervasive obligation of good faith in the context
of controversies over arbitrability.
It is perhaps the pervasiveness of both the good-faith tradition and of judicial review which makes it easier to write an epitaph for Cutler-Hammerthan
39

40

See Summers, supra note 37; Cox, supra note 18.
See Levi, An Evaluation of Labor Arbitration, 8 LAB. L.J. 529, 530 (1957).
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to keep it buried. Thus, the First Circuit, after rejecting Cutler-Hammer,seems
on occasion to have resurrected it.41 Furthermore, in a valuable essay, Professor Cox (whose insights were selectively invoked by the Court in the Warrior
case), 42 after generally condemning Cutler-Hammer, also suggested that it
should be preserved in a limited sphere: "[A]rbitration should be ordered...
whenever the claim might fairly be said to fall within the scope of the collective-bargaining agreement. If the latter contention be made but is patently
frivolous, arbitration should be denied."43 The underlying distinction, which
Cox seems to be suggesting, appears to be between a claim which, although
frivolous, is regulated by the agreement and a frivolous contention that a
grievance falls within the agreement. A similar distinction has been suggested
by Judge Magruder, as I read him.44
The difficulty of administering such a distinction is suggested by academic
criticism of its application by Judge Magruder. 45 Several hypothetical cases
may clarify the difficulties. Suppose a contract with a recognition clause and a
standard arbitration clause is silent about sub-contracting. Is a claim that
sub-contracting violates the recognition clause "within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement"? If so, isn't it because the claim based on the
recognition clause should not be held to be plainly frivolous, i.e., because the
application of Cutler-Hammershould not block arbitration? Or, suppose that
a contract is silent about plant relocation. Is a grievance alleging that plant
removal is a violation of the recognition clause non-arbitrable on the ground
41 See, e.g., Local 201, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. General Elec. Co., 262
F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1958). The court found non-arbitrable a grievance protesting that the
transfer of a senior employee to an identical job on the "lobster shift," in connection with a
reduction in force, violated the seniority clause. The arbitration clause was standard except
that it expressly permitted a judicial test of the arbitrability of an alleged contract violation.
The court declined to give conclusive effect to the union's claim that the seniority clause had
been violated, stating: "The court must be satisfied that this claim is well-founded, that is,
that the arbitrator can use those provisions as a controlling statute to decide the merits of
the grievance." Id. at 271. The court was not so satisfied because it read "transfer," for
seniority purposes, as not including the disputed assignment. It reinforced this textual interpretation by considerations outside the agreement and also noted that arbitrators, under
similar agreements, had rejected similar claims on the merits. Id. at 272. See also Local
149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922, 924 (1st Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
42 See, e.g., 363 U.S. at 579-80.
4
3 COX, supra note 18, at 1516, which supports the foregoing suggestion by analogy to
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). In that case, the Court, in finding federal jurisdiction,
emphasized that the substantive claim based on alleged violations of the federal constitution
was not "patently without merit." It is difficult to see how the analogy to Bell V.Hood would
aid the federal courts to solve the central issue raised by Cutler-Hammer-the extent to
which the merits of a grievance may be considered by the courts. Indeed, it is arguable that
Bell v. Hood,assuming arguendo that it is an appropriate analogy, supports Cutler-Hammer
without qualification.

44 See note 41 supra.

45 Wellington, supra note 18, at 1289; Cox, supra note 18, at 1512-13.
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that relocation cannot reasonably be said to be within the scope of the agreement? Would such a claim, nevertheless, become arbitrable if the agreement
explicitly sanctioned relocation, since such a provision would bring the disputed matter within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement? If the
answer is "yes," the suggested formula would produce this anomaly: The
more "frivolous" a grievance on its face, i.e., the more clearly its merits are
denied by the agreement, the stronger the case for arbitrability. If the answer
is "no," it is difficult to know what is meant by the key phrase in Cox's formula-"within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement."
The basic difficulty with a partial repudiation of Cutler-Hammer is, I believe, that every claim pressed as arbitrable is in one sense "within the scope
of the collective agreement" in that any claim, whether it is meritorious, marginal or frivolous, is governed by the agreement. But this truism leads only to the
approach in American Manufacturing, which is a corollary of the unqualified
rejection of Cutler-Hammer. A less sweeping rejection would, as already indicated, involve a judicial inquiry as to whether the subject involved in the
union's grievance may fairly be said to have been regulated by the contract
read in the light of the relevant context. If the court finds such contractual
regulation, the interpretation of the regulation is left to the arbitrator; if the
court does not make such a finding, the grievance would be held non-arbitrable under a standard arbitration clause. But such a judicial inquiry necessarily calls for an interpretation of the reach of the substantive provisions of
the agreement. And it is such substantive interpretation which the critics of
Cutler-Hammerhave condemned. Indeed, the decision in Cutler-Hammeritself46 could be defended on the ground that the union's demand for a bonus
payment was not fairly within the scope of a provision requiring discussion
of a bonus and that the union's demand was, accordingly, not arbitrable.
The forgoing considerations suggest that Cutler-Hammer must be completely accepted or completely rejected. Any attempt at qualified rejection
would produce anomalous results and, like the acceptance of Cutler-Hammer,

would inevitably involve courts in the merits. The Court in American Manufacturing, without explicitly considering a qualified rejection, seems to have
completely repudiated Cutler-Hammerby unqualifiedly condemning judicial

appraisal of the merits of grievances.
My exploration of the controversial questions posed by the acceptance or
the rejection of Cutler-Hammer, but neglected by the Court, would be misunderstood if it were taken as criticism of the Court's repudiation of that doctrine. Repudiation seems justifiable, but not because it reflects the parties' purposes. On the contrary, the uncertainty as to those purposes required the
Court to choose between the risks of arbitral autonomy and those of judicial
intervention. A fully informed choice would presuppose a careful compara46

See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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tive study of the quality of judicial and arbitral determinations under labor
agreements. But such studies do not, to my knowledge, exist, are beyond the
resources of the Court, 47 and would, in any event, involve difficulties because
of the absence of generally accepted criteria for testing the quality of adjudication. In the absence of such comparative studies, it was appropriate for the
Court to give weight to competent studies of judicial intervention 48 which
stressed the difficulties involved. Here, as in other contexts, the Court, and
commentators, may take comfort in Samuel Butler's observation that "life is
the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises."
Even those who applaud the Court's rejection of Cutler-Hammermay have
doubts about the additional requirement that the opponent of arbitrability
establish his case "with positive assurance." This rule is apparently to apply
to all standard clauses "in the absence of any express provision excluding a
particular grievance from arbitration." Consensual considerations scarcely
support such an onerous requirement. If the parties gave any thought to the
burden of persuasion, they, or one of them, presumably would have relied on
the law of commercial contracts, which requires the proponent of arbitrability
to establish the breach of an agreement to arbitrate.4 9 It is true, as the Court
emphasized,50 that there are important differences between commercial and
labor arbitration. But such differences would not have foreclosed reliance by
the parties on a close, if imperfect, analogy. It is also true that the allocation
and the weight of the burden of persuasion generally reflect policy, rather
than consensual, considerations. Thus it is arguable that the Court's rule was
justified by its view that an autonomous system of arbitration is good for the
parties. But in the context of labor arbitration there is a legislative obstacle to
the Court's implementing its policy preferences through the imposition of extraordinary procedural burdens. Congress, reflecting the general commitment
to free collective bargaining, declared only that voluntary arbitration, and
not all grievance-arbitration, is desirable.51 Furthermore, the parties' voluntary acceptance of arbitration for most unsettled grievances tells us precious
little about their attitudes with respect to extraordinary grievances which may
activate the defense of non-arbitrability. These considerations suggest that a
47 Cf. Karst, Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 75, 76-77,
passim. See also note 17 supra.
48 See note 37 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Karst, supra note 47 at 105.
49 See authorities cited in the dissent of Whittaker, J., in Warrior,363 U.S. at 586-87. Cf.
Magruder, J., in Local 149, American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 250
F.2d 922, 927 (Ist Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958): "[W]hen one of the parties
needs the aid of a court, and asks the court for a decree ordering specific performance of a
contract to arbitrate, we think that the court, before rendering such a decree has the inescapable obligation to determine as a preliminary matter that the defendant has contracted
to refer such issue to arbitration, and has broken this promise."
50 363 U.S. at 567; 363 U.S. at 578.

51 See LMRA, § 203(d), 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1958).
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rule demanding, in effect, proof beyond a reasonable doubt by the opponent
of arbitrability is immoderate.
In addition to the general rules, which I have examined, the Court made
sweeping and troublesome pronouncements about no-strike clauses, labor
agreements and labor arbitration. The elusive overtones of those pronouncements are perhaps the most disturbing aspects of these cases.
As to no-strike clauses, the Court announced in American Manufacturing:
"There is no exception in the no-strike clause and none, therefore, should be
read into the grievance [sic, arbitration?] clause, since one is the quid pro quo
for the other."5 2 And in Warrior: "A collective bargaining agreement may
treat only with certain specific practices, leaving the rest to management but
subject to the possibility of work stoppages. When, however, an absolute nostrike clause is included in the agreement, then in a very real sense everything
that management does is subject to the agreement, for either management is
prohibited or limited in the action it takes, or if not, it is protected from interference by strikes."53
The quidproargument, which harks back to Lincoln Mills,54 is based on the
assumption that an arbitration clause and a no-strike clause are traded one
for the other. But that assumption ignores that each of these clauses is merely
one element of a total negotiating package.S5 Moreover, and more important,
the Court ignores that an agreement is often designed to insulate some managerial decisions against both arbitration and strikes. Management may consider that only such dual protection will assure the stability and the freedom
in some areas which management may seek through the agreement. The
LMRA56 also seeks to promote such stability by proscribing economic pressure directed at contract modification during the term of the agreement and,
contrary to the passage from Warrior quoted above, such proscription is
wholly independent of the scope of the parties' no-strike agreement.
52 363 U.S. at 567.

53 363 U.S. at 583. The Court also stated: "Complete effectuation of the federal policy
is achieved when the agreement contains both an arbitration provision for all unresolved
grievances and an absolute prohibition of strikes, the arbitration agreement being the 'quid
pro quo' for the agreement not to strike. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
455." Id. at 578 n.4. But cf. Fulda, The No-Strike Clause, 21 GEO.WASH. L. Rav. 127,

155-57 (1952), reporting on situations where both labor and management have expressed
a contrary judgment in connection with sensitive issues, such as production standards.
S4 See note 53 supra.
55 Cf. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259, F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1958) (Strike to settle a
dispute which collective agreement provides shall be settled by exclusive grievance-arbitration procedure violates the agreement despite another contractual provision expressly super-

seding a previous no-strike clause). An evenly divided Court affirmed this holding. 361 U.S.
459, 464 (1960).
56 Section 8(d)(4), 61 Stat. 601 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160 (d)(4) (1958); the interpretive issues
raised by this section are considered in NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.

1952).
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That passage from Warriorinvolves an additional difficulty-it implies that
a no-strike clause protects management against strikes only if it takes action
not prohibited by the agreement. But this implication must have been unintended because it ignores that arbitration (or the judiciary) is available to
remedy management's departures from the agreement. In any event, regardless of the existence or the scope of a no-strike clause, everything that management does is subject to the agreement in the sense that the agreement and its
implications either permit or prohibit managerial action.
The Court's exegesis as to no-strike clauses, because it is so puzzling and is
57
linked to an expansive view of arbitrability, will give rise to speculations
that the Court implied that the arbitration clause and no-strike clause must
be considered to be coextensive. Such a rule, as a guide in resolving ambiguities in either clause, is implicit in the Court's approach and is desirable. But
it seems clear that the Court has not gone further and imposed an inflexible
requirement of corresponding coverage for each of these two clauses. On the
contrary, the Court made it plain that clear and specific limitations on arbitration clauses will be respected in actions arising under section 301.58
The impact on section 8(a)(5) of the Court's coupling of no-strike and arbitration clauses is somewhat more uncertain. American Insurance5 9 intimated
that section 8(a)(5) of the LMRA does not prohibit an employer from bargaining for both a limited arbitration and a broad no-strike clause. But in
Cummer-Graham Co.60 the NLRB recently approved a finding by a
trial examiner (who had invoked Lincoln Mills) that an employer had violated
section 8(a)(5) by insisting on a no-strike clause (with money penalties) while
rejecting arbitration in toto and demanding final employer determination of
grievances. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the employer's position
did not even constitute evidence of bad faith.61 Cummer-Graham, which also
involved extensive dilatory and obstructive bargaining tactics by the employer, is a far cry from the limited qualifications on arbitration discussed by
the Court in the instant cases. Furthermore, those cases, which did not even
mention the issue of good faith bargaining, have contradictory implications as
to that issue. The Court's emphasis on the consensual nature of arbitration,
coupled with its insistence that exemptions from arbitration be clear, implies
that an employer may, without violating section 8(a)(5), seek such exemptions
57 Management lawyers in the audience expressed such fears.
58 Text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.

S9 NLRB v. American Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408 n.22 (1952). Three justices dissented without, however, suggesting that section 8(a) (5) required any particular relationship
between the respective coverage of the two clauses.
60 122 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1072 (1959).
61 NLRB v, Cummer-Graham Co., 279 F.2d 757, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1960).
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while also demanding a broad no-strike clause. On the other hand, the
Court's emphasis on the interdependence of arbitration and no-strike clauses
and on the desirability of broad and reciprocal coverage in such clauses, may
be invoked in support of the position that bargaining demands inconsistent
with such interdependence are per se violations of section 8(a)(5) or section
8(b)(3) or at least evidence of such violations.
Such a position under the extreme circumstances which the Board found
in Cummer-Graham is appealing, but Board doctrines provoked by extreme
cases tend to proliferate into detailed regulations of the bargaining process
and of bargaining demands. Such regulation has been forcefully criticized63
as placing an undue premium on the rhetoric of bargaining, as ignoring the
problems distinctive to particular relationships, and as fundamentally incompatible with the general policy of leaving the terms of agreements to private
persuasion and power. These considerations are weighty reasons against the
Board's resorting to sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)64 to compel reciprocity with
respect to demands for arbitration clauses and no-strike clauses, respectively.
The ambivalent language in Warrior and American Manufacturing scarcely

affords respectable support for such compulsion.
The Court's essay on the labor agreement and labor arbitration, was as
unnecessary and as troublesome as its treatment of no-strike clauses. That
essay, in my view, is extravagant in its emphasis on the uniqueness of the labor
agreement, the mysteries of labor arbitration, and the activism which parties
are universally supposed to expect from arbitrators.
The agreement, writes Mr. Justice Douglas, "is more than a contract; it is
a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate. [It] covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into
62 The concurring opinion, although not addressed specifically to section 8(a)(5), emphasized this, "for the arbitration promise is itself a contract. The parties are free to make that

promise as broad or narrow as they wish, for there is no compulsion in law requiring them
to include any such promises in their agreement." 363 U.S. at 570. Later, the concurring
opinion declared: "I do not understand the Court to mean that the application of the principles announced today depends upon the presence of a no-strike clause in the agreement."
Id. at 573.
6
3 See generally, Cox and Donlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National
Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 389 (1950); Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme
Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. Rav. 1057, 1077-86 (1958). Cf. Meltzer, The
Chicago & North Western Case:Judicial Workmanship and Collective Bargaining,1960 Sup.
CT.REv. 113, 127 n.61.
64 The Board's reasoning in Cummer-Graham, 122 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1959), implies that a
union would violate Section 8(b)(3) of the LMRA by insisting on a broad grievance-arbitration procedure while resisting a broad no-strike clause. Any attempt to apply such an approach would involve the Board in the impossible task of dealing with a broad range of
limitations on no-strike clauses. For an indication of the variations in such clauses, see
Wolk & Nix, Work Stoppage Provisions in Union Agreements, 74 MONTHLY LAB. Rav.
272 (1952); Fulda, supra note 53, at 153.
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being a new common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a
particular plant." 65 It reflects the compulsions on the parties to deal with each
other and their attempt to establish the rule of law for what would otherwise
be a regime of power:
Arbitration is a means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private
law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way
which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties ....
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts ....
The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only
what the contract says but, insofar as the ... agreement permits, such factors as the
effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the
shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.... The
ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to
bear upon the determination of a grievance because he cannot be similarly in66
formed.
In Enterprise Wheel, the Justice elaborates on this theme by a quotation em6
phasizing the otherworldly characteristics of the plant. 7
Mr. Justice Douglas seems to be saying that the law for the labor agreement
should be divorced from the general law of contracts 68 because the labor agreement is sui generis and the problems of labor arbitration are so esoteric. But
the sui generis label, which is equally applicable to a large variety of agreements, surely does not answer the question of what insights built into the
general law are relevant for the development of the law of the labor agreement. Indeed, it is worth remembering that the general tradition has supplied
much of the rhetoric surrounding the labor agreement and has called for
interpretation responsive to the distinctive functions of such agreements.
Thus, the now modish rhetoric that labor agreements are constitutions had
its parallel in well-aged discussions of other forms of agreement. 69 And surely,
65 363 U.S. at 578.

66 Ibid.

67 "Persons unfamiliar with mills and factories-farmers or professors, for example-often remark upon visiting them that they seem like another world.... The newly
hired employee, the 'green hand,' is gradually initiated into what amounts to a miniature
society. There he finds himself in a strange environment that assaults his senses with unusual
sounds and smells and often with different 'weather conditions' such as sudden drafts of
heat, cold, or humidity. He discovers that the society of which he only gradually becomes
a part has of course a formal government of its own-the rules which management and the
union have laid down-but that it also differs from or parallels the world outside in social
classes, folklore, ritual, and traditions." United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960). Professors, of course, arbitrate a large bulk of the disputes arising in the strange world of industry.
68 In support of his views, Mr. Justice Douglas (363 U.S. at 579) quoted from Professor
Cox's article (supra note 18, at 1498-99), but ignored Cox's balanced suggestion (id. at
1485-89) that the judge-made law of contracts, administered in the light of the distinctive
problems and purposes of labor agreements, can illuminate the solution of the legal and
arbitral problems arising under such agreements.
69 See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective,40 YALE L.J. 704, 706
(1931).
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it is scarcely necessary any longer to elaborate on the judicial tradition which
stresses context, purposes, consequences, and need in resolving the ambiguities and gaps which creep into an almost infinite variety of commercial contracts, 70 as well as labor agreements. The relevance of that tradition to problems arising under labor agreements was recently underscored by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who declared:
Underlying the Court's view is the assumption that the law of contracts is a
rigorously closed system applicable to a limited class of arrangements between parties acting at arm's length, and that collective bargaining agreements are a very
special class of voluntary agreements to which the general law pertaining to the
construction and enforcement of contracts is not relevant. As a matter of fact, the
governing rules pertaining to contracts recognize the diversity of situations in relation to which contracts are made and duly allow for these variant factors in construing and enforcing contracts. And so, of course, in construing agreements for the
reciprocal rights and obligations of employers and employees, account must be
taken of the many implications relevant to construing a document that governs industrial relations. There is no reason for jettisoning principles of fairness and justice
that are as relevant to the law's attitude in the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements as they are to contracts dealing with other affairs, even giving due regard
to the circumstances of industrial life and to the libretto that this furnishes in con7
struing collective bargaining agreements. '
Perhaps it was insufficient attention to these modulated observations which
resulted in an opinion which may invite unsophisticated arbitrators to try to
improve, rather than interpret, the parties' bargain. But, it should be noted,
the Court's invitation is unclear and ambivalent. It is only "insofar as the
contractpermits" that, according to Warrior,the parties expect the arbitrator
to consider "such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result,
its consequences to ... morale . . , whether tensions will be heightened or
diminished."7 2 The parties may expect all this, but one or both of them will
forcefully urge that one purpose of the agreement was to avoid, or at least
to limit, the need for appraisal of such sensitive variables by outsiders and
especially ad hoc arbitrators, whose knowledge about any particular plant
often comes solely from a relatively short hearing and whose responsibility
ends with the award. Indeed, the Court seemed to sense the possibility that
the Warrior opinion might stimulate too much free thinking by arbitrators.
In the last of the three cases, Enterprise Wheel,73 it stressed the restraints on
personal statesmanship imposed by the orthodox faith. In the end, the Court,
70 See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 300, 303 (1923), and comments by Llewellyn, supra
note 69, at 746 n.86.
71 Dissenting in Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 475-76 (1960).
72 363 U.S. at 582. (Emphasis added.) For a review of the long-standing controversy
about the proper role of the arbitrator, see SMITH, LABOR LAW, CASES AND MATERiALS 895-

97 (2d. ed. 1953).
73 United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); see
text accompanying note 86 infra.
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despite its splendid rhetoric about the uniqueness of labor arbitration, restored it to the universe of the contract.
Unlike its two companions, Enterprise Wheel arose from an action to enforce an award. The pertinent agreement contained a standard clause providing for arbitration of "differences as to meaning and application." It also provided for reinstatement and back pay for employees disciplined or discharged
without just cause. The employer had refused to arbitrate a grievance contesting the discharge of eleven employees for walking out to protest the discharge
of another employee. About seven months after the discharges and four
74
months after the expiration of the agreement, which had not been renewed,
the union filed an action in a federal district court, which ordered arbitration.
The arbitrator, holding that a ten-day suspension was the maximum penalty
justifiable, awarded reinstatement and back pay (including pay which would
have been earned after the expiration of the agreement) minus ten days' pay
and outside earnings. Subsequently, the federal district court directed the
employer to comply with that award. The court of appeals reversed as to the
award of reinstatement and back pay for the period after the expiration date
75
of the agreement and was in turn reversed by the Court, with Mr. Justice
Whittaker dissenting.
Before turning to the Court's general approach, a word about the particular
decision is in order. The obstacle to enforcement considered decisive by both
the court of appeals 76 and Mr. Justice Whittaker77 was that the award had
extended contract obligations beyond the contract term. Without such extension, the grievants' employment, Mr. Justice Whittaker urged, became an
at-will relationship upon the expiration of the agreement; thus the discharge
became privileged at that time.
The foregoing argument, which was not discussed by the Court, is not free
from substantial difficulties. If the award had been rendered prior to the contract's expiration date, the employer's discharge authority would have been
subject to substantial extra-legal restraints. The union, despite the absence of
a renewal agreement, had retained its majority status and might well have
organized economic reprisals, or such reprisals might have occurred spontaneously. Furthermore, the employer might have considered it improper to
74 See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327, 329 (4th Cir.
1959).
75 The Court, without discussing the question, affirmed jurisdiction under section 301,
even though the rights being asserted were "personal" to the employees. Cf. Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). The trial court had
found Westinghouse inapposite, at least where an award in favor of individual employees
resulted from judicially compelled, as opposed to voluntary, submission. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 168 F. Supp. 308, 309 (S.D. W.Va. 1958). See generally
Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations: II, 59
COLuM. L. Rav. 269, 270-72, n.201 (1959).
77 See 363 U.S. at 600-02.
76 See 269 F.2d at 331.
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discharge for a reason previously adjudicated as insufficient. Consequently,
in the hypothetical situation, a timely remedy for the employer's wrong might
78
have preserved the grievants' jobs beyond the expiration of the agreement.
The post-expiration award, like an award during the contract term, was designed to restore to the wronged employees the status they might have enjoyed
but for the employer's breach, first, in discharging them and secondly, in vio79
lating his obligation to arbitrate.
It is true that the lapse of time and the termination of the agreement interposes a "technical" obstacle to the restoration of the employees' status. But
those factors are accidental, rather than essential, from the employees' point
of view. The reality, especially painful to older employees such as those involved in Enterprise WheelO is that they are out of a job, perhaps because of
the employer's misconduct. Since the general purpose of arbitration in wrongful discharge cases is restoration of the status quo, a substantial argument can
be made that the Enterprise Wheel award was within the purpose implicit in
the remedial provision of the agreement. Although that argument presupposes that the relevant contingencies would have developed favorably for the
employees, such a presupposition in favor of the wronged party is justifiable.
The forgoing argument fails to resolve an important question, which was
not mentioned by the majority or the dissent, or the arbitrator: What protection against discharge do the grievants have after reinstatement? To apply a
just-cause standard would be to extend a contract obligation for an indefinite
period after the expiration of the agreement. On the other hand, to recognize
the employer's unlimited right to discharge immediately after reinstatement
would permit him to nullify the reinstatement award and the enforcement
order. This dilemma could be resolved by recognizing the employer's right to
discharge, subject only to the limitation that the discharge should not be
prompted by the conduct already adjudicated by the arbitrator. This solution
is not ideal, since it makes the propriety of any future discharge turn on the
employer's motivation. But motive is often a decisive factor in both labor
arbitrations and NLRB proceedings. Indeed, the suggested solution is similar
to that adopted by the Second Circuit in its first decision in the celebrated
Universal Camera case.81
78 A similar argument was invoked by the district court in enforcing the award. See
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 168 F. Supp. 308, 312 (S.D. W.Va.

1958).
79 Ibid. The union filed a grievance six days after the discharges. See Record, Appendix
to Appellee's Brief, p. 18.
S0 The district court was apparently moved by this factor, stating: "The Court is informed

that the men involved here are somewhat elderly men, to whom seniority is of utmost importance and to whom back wages are only a comparatively incidental factor. The reinstatement is the moving factor of the union's interest and right in this case." 168 F. Supp. at 312.
81NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), rev'don othergrounds,
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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The importance of Enterprise Wheel lies, not in the decision, but in the
broad remedial authority granted to arbitrators. The Court declared: "When
an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining
agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a
fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating
remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should
82
be awarded to meet a particular contingency."
But, the opinion continues,8 3 the agreement "could have provided" that
the remedy for wrongful discharge should be reinstatement and back pay for
the period after the agreement terminated; therefore, the arbitrator had the
authority to determine whether the agreement should be so construed. To
hold that the remedy was barred because the agreement did not provide for
it would be unacceptable. That view "would require courts, even under the
standard arbitration clause, to review the merits of every construction of the
contract"8 4 and such review would involve the "fundamental error" condemned in American Manufacturing.8 5 Consequently, insofar as the "arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different
from his."86
The only limitation on the arbitrator's remedial power which the Court
explicitly recognizes is found in the following passage:
Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-

ment. When the arbitrator'swords manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts
have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.8 7
At first glance, the foregoing passage might be read as implying that the
courts are to see to it that an award "draws its essence" from the agreement.
But a closer look suggests a much narrower judicial limitation on the arbitrator's autonomy, that is, a limitation which does no more than regulate the
rhetoric of his award. Thus the italicized sentence suggests that the arbitrator's remedial action is not to be disturbed provided that his award purportedly rests on the agreement. It is only when his "words," as opposed to his
result, manifest an infidelity to the agreement that judicial enforcement is to
be denied. Furthermore, when as in Enterprise Wheel itself, it is not clear
from the arbitrator's words whether he based the award on the agreement,
82 363 U.S. at 597.
Id. at 598.
85 Id. at 599.
84 Id. at 598-99.
86 Ibid.
87 Id. at 597. (Emphasis added.) This passage follows immediately after the language
quoted in text accompanying note 82 supra,
83
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the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of enforcing the award. To require
arbitrators to write unambiguous opinions, Mr. Justice Douglas fears,88 would
discourage the writing of any opinions-a result that would be undesirable
because a well-reasoned opinion promotes confidence in arbitration and
clarifies the agreement.
The Court's general approach to the arbitrator's remedial authority dovetails with its approach to his interpretation of substantive provisions of the
agreement announced in American Manufacturing.The arbitrator may, without judicial challenge, formulate remedies not provided by the contract. Furthermore, under a literal interpretation of the Court's language, a court
should not upset arbitral remedies which it deems to be proscribed by the
agreement, so long as the arbitrator has based the remedy on contractual
language. Otherwise, judicial denial of enforcement would necessarily involve
a forbidden consideration of the merits.
The Court thus appears to reject a familiar suggestion, that a concept of
primary jurisdiction should apply to judicial action impinging on labor arbitration. Under this suggestion, the judicial role would be more expansive in
enforcement actions than in actions to compel arbitration.8 9 The basis for this
difference is that at the enforcement stage courts would have the benefit of
the expertise imputed to the arbitrator. But a primary jurisdiction approach,
despite its appeal, cannot be derived from the parties' bargain, which is the
ostensible justification for the Court's distribution of power between arbitrators and courts. Nor is such an approach consistent with the Court's position
in American Manufacturing and Enterprise Wheel. That position means, at
least under a standard arbitration clause, that the question for the court before an award is whether the union's words claim a violation of the agreement.
In the enforcement action a similar question is before the court-whether the
arbitrator asserts that his remedy and, presumably, the substantive obligation
it implements, are based on the agreement. Thus, both before and after an
award, an ipse dixit appears to afford invulnerable protection against judicial
interference with arbitral autonomy in applying the agreement. 90 Nevertheless, if arbitrators should award novel and drastic remedies, it would not be
surprising if the Court limited its grant of remedial autonomy.
The three cases, read together, sanction a striking conscription of judicial
power. The lower courts are commanded to exercise their equitable powers,
notwithstanding their own conviction that there is no rational basis in the
88 See 363 U.S. at 598.
89 Such a provision was embodied in the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act. See Justin,
Arbitrabilityand the Arbitrator'sJurisdiction, in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBrTRATON PROCESS 10 (1956).

90 Judicial power to deny arbitrability on grounds independent of interpretation, such
as the invalidity of the agreement or repugnance of particular provisions to public policy,
is not affected by these cases. Simiarly, judicial power to vacate an award on such grounds,
or on grounds of denial of a fair hearing, is unaffected.
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parties' agreement either for recourse to arbitration or for the resultant
award. This result is reminiscent of the late Dean Shulman's admonition that
the law-but not the lawyers-should stay out of arbitration.9' The Court's
authority and influence may be adequate to keep the law out while the judges
stay in. But such an attempted insulation of judges from judicial traditions has
built-in weaknesses, which probably will be exposed by subsequent litigation
over the limits of the Court's approach in these three cases.
That approach does not, of course, compel the parties to accept the Court's
view of the blessings of arbitral autonomy. The Court merely required, as a
foundation for increased judicial supervision, contract clauses implementing
92
that purpose clearly-or very clearly.
The vigor with which management will press for restrictive clauses, 93 and
the resistance and the number of strikes which may result, are, of course,
conjectural. All that is clear is that generalizations as to the effect of the
Court's approach on bargaining would not be fruitful since the consequences
will vary with the bargaining relationships.
Where the collective bargaining relationship is established and the union
secure, and where arbitration has worked reasonably well, it is doubtful that
employers will seek to modify a standard clause. Such modifications would be
of major practical importance only if one of the parties contemplated judicial
tests of the arbitrator's powers. Such tests have, however, been infrequent for
several reasons: First, if a grievance is so weak as to permit a persuasive claim
of non-arbitrability, the risk that an arbitrator will sustain the grievance on
its merits is correspondingly reduced. Secondly, recourse to the courts disturbs the continuing relationship and may stir up the employees, especially
if the union wishes to exploit the situation for that purpose. Finally, the drafting of effective restrictions on arbitral autonomy now involves increased and
formidable difficulties.94 These factors suggest that employers are likely to
91See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999,

1024 (1955).
92 But cf. the discussion of Section 8(a)(5) of the LMRA, notes 59-63 supra and accom-

panying text.
93 Such clauses include (1) narrow definitions of grievances, (e.g., restricting grievances
to claims alleging violations of express and specific provisions of the agreement, and thereby
seeking to exclude claims based on "past practices" or on broad implications from recognition and seniority clauses); (2) specific exclusion clauses barring arbitration of managerial
conduct in certain sensitive areas, without regard to claims of management's bad faith or
to claims that action within the excluded area violated contractual provisons; (3) provisions
making a variation of Cutler-Hammer the test of arbitrability; (4) specification of, and restrictions on, remedial authority. Any effort to incorporate such clauses would obviously
complicate negotiations. Furthermore, the moral basis for union opposition to such demands
will be strengthened by the Court's strong endorsement of arbitral autonomy and by its
coupling of the no-strike and arbitration clauses. Finally, specific restrictions on arbitration
and on arbitral remedies, unless they are comprehensive in coverage, are likely to activate
the inclusio-unius argument.
94 See note 93 supra,
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shrink from multiplying negotiating issues by insistence on clauses which are
of uncertain effectiveness and which, in any event, make a difference only
when both the union and a mutually appointed arbitrator adopt outrageous
positions.
Where a union is negotiating its first agreement with a newly unionized
enterprise, the impact of the Court's approach on negotiations may be more
substantial. It is at this stage that mutual fear and distrust and the desire to
preserve (or to share) sovereignty are at their height. Here also, the union,
especially if it promised much during an organizing campaign, may be reluctant to rock the boat by strikes over non-money issues. Employers, concerned
about the Court's sweeping language and its flirtation with arbitral activism,
may press for clauses limiting arbitration and expanding judicial control.
It would be ironic if the Court's immoderate eulogy of arbitration were to
operate to limit its use in the newly organized plant or in plants where labor
and management have not achieved a workable accommodation. It is
in such plants that day by day adjustments may be especially difficult and that
arbitration may be especially useful. It is not too much to hope that the good
judgment of the parties and of arbitrators will avoid crippling limitations on
an institution which is a constructive adjunct to collective bargaining even
though it is not free from imperfections associated with other earthly forms
of adjudication.

